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TESTING THE LIMITS OF PATENT
EXHAUSTION'S "AUTHORIZED SALE"
REQUIREMENT USING CURRENT HIGH-TECH
LICENSING PRACTICES
Tyler Thorp, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current trend in United States Supreme Court
patent decisions is to restrict the boundaries of patent rights
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,2 the
Supreme Court's
latest decision
regarding patent
exhaustion,3 the Court held that "the authorized sale of an
article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the
patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from
invoking patent law to control the post-sale use of the
article." Two legal issues regarding the limits of patent
exhaustion's "authorized sale" requirement, which affect
*Articles Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 50; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law, 2010; Ph.D., Electrical Engineering, University
of Washington, 1999; M.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Washington,
1998; B.S., Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, 1996. I would
like to thank my wife, Karen, and my children Derek, Adam, and Anna for their
support. I would also like to thank Professor Colleen Chien, Tanya de la Fuente
Holland, Loretta Peters, and E. Earle Thompson for their insightful comments.
1. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (limiting a
patent holder's ability to recover damages for overseas infringement); KSR Int'l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (raising the bar for patent holders to
meet the non-obviousness standard); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118 (2007) (expanding the standing of licensees to challenge the validity of
licensed patents); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(raising the bar for patent holders to obtain an injunction); Dawn-Marie Bey,
Quanta v. LG Electronics: More Restrictions on Patent Rights, but No
Exhaustion Windfall, 1 LANDSLIDE 18, 20 (Sept./Oct. 2008).

2. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008).
3. Though it will be defined in greater detail in the subsequent section, the
patent exhaustion doctrine exhausts patent rights with respect to an article if
there is an authorized sale of the article that substantially embodies a patent.
See infra Part II.A.
4. Id. at 2122.
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current high-tech licensing practices, were not specifically
addressed in Quanta.5
The first is whether patent
exhaustion's authorized sale requirement can be satisfied
when a patent agreement does not grant use rights.6 The
second is under what circumstances does a covenant not to
sue satisfy the authorized sale requirement.7
For high-tech companies, unpredictability regarding
these limits can distort the contours of a patent bargain
because both patentees and licensees may not know the exact
implications of their bargain and whether patent exhaustion
will apply.'
The patent exhaustion doctrine should allow
patent holders to receive the fair value for their inventive
contributions by providing flexibility and predictability in
contracting their patent rights.9 However, this flexibility
must be balanced against preventing patent holders from
obtaining more than the fair value by licensing the same
inventive contribution to multiple parties. °
This comment analyzes two current high-tech licensing
practices, and proposes solutions to the two open questions
regarding the limits of the authorized sale requirement.1 1
Both solutions attempt to strike the proper balance between
providing flexibility in contracting patent rights and
preventing patent holders from unfairly receiving multiple
royalties for the same inventive contribution. This comment
first proposes that a patent license grant with the right to
sell, but not the right to use, should satisfy the authorized
sale requirement, because otherwise, a patentee could easily
bypass patent exhaustion by acquiring sufficient value for a
subset of the bundle of rights while purposely leaving out an
insignificant right." Secondly, a covenant not to sue should
satisfy the authorized sale requirement if a patent holder
extracts a sufficient reward for its patents. 3 This comment

5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infra Part IV.A.
9. See Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia Corp. and Nokia, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners at 3-4, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109
(2008) (No. 06-937).
10. See id.
11. See infra Parts IV-V.
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. See infra Part V.B.
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proposes an objective test, which takes the circumstances
surrounding a patent transaction into account, for
determining whether the authorized sale requirement is
satisfied. 4 The test will look to objective factors such as
whether the patentee and covenantee
are market
competitors, whether the patentee is attempting to extract
royalties from multiple points in a product value chain, and
whether the patentee is a non-practicing entity. 5
This comment provides an overview of the patent
exhaustion doctrine 6 and discusses two current high-tech
licensing practices. 7
Part III identifies the legal issues
regarding patent exhaustion's authorized sale requirement.
Next, Part IV analyzes the limits of the authorized sale
requirement.
Lastly, Part V presents solutions for
determining when, in light of today's policy considerations,
the authorized sale requirement is satisfied.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Patent ExhaustionDoctrine
The patent exhaustion doctrine, also known as the firstsale doctrine, "provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."18
The non-statutory doctrine traces its roots to Supreme Court
precedents from the mid-1800s.' 9 The modern doctrine, fully
explicated in United States v. Univis Lens Co. ,2"gained appeal
in the 1990s, "when it came to be viewed as a viable
affirmative defense in situations where there was an
authorized sale of a component of a patented combination.""'
An authorized sale is a sale by the patentee or a licensee
acting within the scope of its license.22
Today, patent

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008).
John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard

Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 643, 647 (2004).

20. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
21. Osborne, supra note 19, at 647.
22. See Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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exhaustion is a key consideration when licensing patents in
industries, such as the high-tech industry, that utilize
complex product value chains.23
1. Patent ExhaustionIs an Implied Authority Defense to
Patent Infringement
The Constitution allows Congress to promote "the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."24
To encourage
innovation, patent laws attempt to balance the grant of
temporary exclusive rights-the incentive for inventors to
publicly disclose their inventions-with the avoidance of
stifling market competition.2"
The exclusive rights granted to patent holders are "the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States," and includes
the right to exclude others from products made by an
inventive process.26 Congress has prescribed that, "whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention" during the lifetime
of the patent grant infringes the patent.2"
Therefore,
activities can lead to infringement only if they are carried out
"without authority" of the patent holder.28
An express license, which may be granted by either oral
or written agreement,2 9 is the clearest grant of authority from
a patent holder." However, authorization may also arise by
implication."
Implied authorization can limit a patent
23. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 5; Brief of
Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Quanta Computer,
Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Motorola, Inc. in Support of Petitioners, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06937).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. See Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 5.
26. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). The patent grant does not give the right to
make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import, but rather it provides the right to
exclude others. Id.
27. Id. § 271(a).
28. See id. § 271(a), (f) & (g).
29. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES §
1:67 (2d ed. 2007).
30. See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2] (2004).

31. SCHLICHER, supra note 29, § 1:68.
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holder's rights when challenging activities involving products
sold by either the patent holder or its licensee under one of
three doctrines.32 The repair right doctrine may apply when a
court interprets a purchaser's activities as merely repairing
the patented product, as opposed to impermissibly making or
reconstructing a new product.33 The implied license doctrine
may apply when a component that is useful in constructing or
carrying out an invention is sold.34 Finally, the patent
exhaustion doctrine may apply when a patent holder3 5or an
authorized licensee makes a sale of a patented product.
Although the implied license and patent exhaustion
defenses have been described as confusingly similar, the
implied license doctrine, born from principles of equity, will
only apply under circumstances where the conduct of the
parties plainly indicates that a license should be inferred.36
Thus, an implied license may be "expressly disclaimed" by the
patent owner. 7 In contrast, "the parties' intent with respect
to downstream customers is of no moment in a patent
exhaustion analysis., 38 Both the implied license and patent
exhaustion doctrines promote market efficiency.39 Absent the
two, a buyer would hesitate to purchase a product at full price
without assurance from the seller that use or resale of the
product would not infringe any of the seller's patents.'
2. A Brief Legal History of PatentExhaustion Following
the History Outlined in Quanta
For over 150 years, the Court has restricted the patent
32. Id. The law generally treats these as separate doctrines. Id.
33. Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 125 (1850).
34. See McCoy, 67 F.3d at 920.
35. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113
(2008).
36. See LG Elecs. Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25956, *8-11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002).
37. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 19. But cf
TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1278
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that a patent, which had not yet issued and was thus
not identified in the TransCore-Mark IV settlement agreement, was exhausted
by Mark IV's authorized sale under an implied license to practice that patent by
virtue of legal estoppel).
38. Transcore, 563 F.3d at 1275.
39. See John W. Schlicher, The New Patent Exhaustion Doctrine of Quanta
v. LG: What it Means for Patent Owners, Licensees, and Product Customers, 90
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 758, 768 (2008).
40. See id.
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rights that endure past the initial authorized sale of a
patented item. 41
In 1852, the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for the patent exhaustion doctrine in Bloomer v.
42 The Court wrote in dicta,
McQuewan.
"when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within
the limits of the monopoly."' Thus, a patent holder should
have no claim for infringement against a buyer who
purchased a product from either the patent holder or a
licensee in an authorized, unrestricted, and unconditional
sale."
In the 1872 decision of Mitchell v. Hawley,45 the Court
clarified that where "a licensee has made an unauthorized
sale outside the scope of its license, the downstream
purchaser infringes even if it lacks notice that the licensee is
acting in an unauthorized manner." 6 The Court found that
an innocent purchaser of an unauthorized sale may be held
liable for patent infringement because "the law imposes the
risk upon the purchaser, as against the real owner, whether
the title of the seller is such that he can make a valid
conveyance.4 7
Forty years later, the Court decided Henry v. A.B. Dick
Co.,48 a case involving mimeograph machines sold without "an
attached license stipulating that the machine could only be
used only with ink, paper, and other supplies made by the
A.B. Dick Company". 9 Today, the Court interprets this
decision as rejecting the notion that "a patent holder 'can only
keep the article within the control of the patent by retaining
the title,' and held that any 'reasonable stipulation, not
inherently violative of some substantive law' was 'valid and
enforceable."'5 "
The Court only required the company to
notify the purchaser that, instead of "an unconditional title to
the machine," the purchaser was only entitled to a "qualified

41. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008).
42. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852).
43. Id. at 549.
44. SCHLICHER, supra note 29, § 8:14.
45. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (21 Wall.) 544 (1872).
46. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp. in
Support of Petitioners at 16, Quanta, 128 S.Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937).
47. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 550.
48. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
49. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2116 n.2.
50. Id. (quoting AB.Dick, 224 U.S. at 18) (citation omitted).
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right to use."5 ' "Although the Court permitted post-sale
restrictions on the use of a patented article in A.B. Dick, the
decision was short-lived.5
Several years later, Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Manufacturing Co. 3 explicitly overruled A.B.
Dick to prevent patent holders from using A.B. Dick-style
licenses to limit the use of their products and thereby
effectively use their patents to secure market control of
related, unpatented items.' In Motion Picture Patents, the
Court found that limiting the use of a film projector to only
films made by the same company amounted to an attempted
"monopoly in the manufacture and use of moving picture
films."5 Observing that the primary purpose of the patent
laws is "to promote the progress of science and useful arts,"
the Motion Picture Patents Court held that "'the scope of the
grant which may be made to an inventor.., must be limited
to the invention described in the claims of his patent"' and
not be allowed to extend to unpatented components. 6
In General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co.,"'
a company purchased patented amplifiers for use in "talking
picture" theaters from a seller who held a license to "make
and sell amplifiers for use in radio broadcast reception, radio
amateur reception, and radio experimental reception
radios." 8 The Court made clear that a patent holder may
legally limit a licensee's right to make sales for particular
purposes or uses.59 In general, contractual conditions such as
field-of-use,
temporal
restrictions,
and
geographical
restrictions, will "be enforced through the patent law unless
the court determines that they violate some other law or
policy, such as antitrust law or the doctrine of patent
misuse. '" ° Therefore, patent exhaustion may not apply if a
51. Id. (quoting A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 26).
52. Id. at 2115-16 (citation and footnote omitted).
53. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
54. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2116.
55. Motion Picture Patents,243 U.S. at 518.
56. Quanta, 128 S.Ct. at 2116 (citing Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. at
511) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Gen. Talking Pictures Co. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
58. See SCHLICHER, supra note 29, § 8:58 (citing Gen. Talking Pictures, 305
U.S. 124).
59. Id.
60. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
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licensee or purchaser performs activities in violation of a
lawful restriction or condition (i.e., performs activities outside
those legally authorized by the seller)."
In United States v. Univis Lens Co., a holder of eyeglass
lens patents:
licensed a purchaser to manufacture lens blanks, by
fusing together different lens segments to create bi- and
tri-focal lenses and to sell them to other Univis licensees
at agreed-upon rates. Wholesalers were licensed to grind
the blanks into the patented finished lenses, which they
would then sell to Univis-licensed prescription retailers
for resale at a fixed rate.62
The Univis Court noted that the "incident to the purchase of
any article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to
use and sell it, and, upon familiar principles, the authorized
sale of an article which is capable of use only in practicing the
patent is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with
respect to the article sold."63 The Court assumed that the
patents containing claims for the finished lenses were
practiced in part by the wholesalers and the finishing
retailers who ground the blanks into lenses, and held that the
sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patents on the finished
lenses.'
The Univis Court explained that the lens blanks
"embodie[d] essential features of the patented device and
[were] without utility until . . . ground and polished as the
finished lens of the patent."' The Court concluded "that the
traditional bar on patent restrictions following the sale of an
item applies when the item sufficiently embodies the patent
-even if it does not completely practice the patent-such
that its only and intended
use is to be finished under the
66
terms of the patent."

LAW 279 (2004).
61. See SCHLICHER, supra note 29, §§ 8:60-8:63.
62. Id. (citing Univis, 316 U.S. 241).
63. Univis, 316 U.S. at 249.
64. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2116 (citing Univis, 316 U.S. 241) (footnote

omitted).
65. Id. (quoting Univis, 316 U.S. at 250-51) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
66. Id. at 2117 (citing Univis, 316 U.S. 241).
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a. QuantaComputer, Inc. v. LG Electronics., Inc.
The Court recently considered the contours of the patent
exhaustion doctrine in Quanta." In this case, LG Electronics
(LGE) licensed computer system patents to Intel that
contained both method and apparatus claims.' "The License
Agreement authorize[d] Intel to make, use, sell (directly or
indirectly), offer to sell, import, or otherwise dispose of its
own products practicing the LGE Patents." 9 In a separate
agreement ("Master Agreement") with LGE, Intel agreed to
notify its customers in writing that the LGE "license does not
extend . . . to any product that [the customers] make by
combining an Intel product with any non-Intel product.""
The separate agreement also stated that "a breach of this
Agreement shall have no effect on and shall not be grounds
for termination of the Patent License."7' Quanta purchased
microprocessors and chipsets from Intel, and received the
notice required by the separate agreement.7 2 Nonetheless,
Quanta manufactured computers using Intel parts in
combination with non-Intel memory and buses in ways that
practiced the LGE patents.73
The Court noted that nothing in the license agreement
restricted Intel's right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets
to purchasers who intended to combine them with non-Intel
parts, or limited Intel's ability to sell its products practicing
LGE patents.7 4
Furthermore, a breach of the separate
agreement would not constitute a breach of the license
agreement, and therefore Intel's authority to sell its products
embodying the LGE patents was not conditioned on the notice
provision being satisfied or Quanta's decision to abide by
LGE's directions in that notice.7 Thus, the performance of
the license agreement was independent of the separate
agreement. 76
67. Id. 2109.
68. Id. at 2114.
69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2110 (2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Id. at 2114 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 2110.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2121.
75. Id. at 2122.
76. See MARK S. HOLMES, PATENT LICENSING: STRATEGY, NEGOTIATION,
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The Court stated that method claims may be exhausted."
A contrary decision would undermine the patent exhaustion
doctrine because patentees "could simply draft their patent
claims to describe a method rather than an apparatus." 8 The
Court noted that apparatus and method claims "may
approach each other so nearly that it will be difficult to
distinguish the process from the function of the apparatus."79
In this regard, Quanta is consistent with Univis. °
Further, the Court stated that "the authorized sale of an
article that substantially embodies a patent exhausts the
patent holder's rights and prevents the patent holder from
invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the article."8'
An article substantially embodies a patent if there is "no
reasonable noninfringing use," and it includes "all the
inventive aspects of the patented methods."82 An incomplete
article substantially embodies a patent when the steps
necessary to practice the patent are "common and
noninventive," such as requiring the application of common
processes, or the addition or removal of standard parts.8
In sum, Quanta reaffirmed Univis, and held that the
patent exhaustion doctrine applies to method claims.
It
further held that because the patent license agreement
between LGE and Intel authorized Intel to sell components
that substantially embody the LGE patents, "the patent
exhaustion doctrine prevents LGE from further asserting its
patent rights with respect to the patents substantially
embodied by those products."' Because the steps taken by
Quanta necessary to practice the LGE patents were "common
and noninventive," the Quanta products created by combining
Intel parts with non-Intel parts substantially embodied the

FORMS § 17:4.9[A] (2008).
77. Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2117.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 2117-18 (quoting United States ex rel Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S.
543, 559 (1904)).
80. Id. at 2117.
81. Id. at 2122.

82. Id.
83. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2120

(2008).
84. See id. at 2113.
85. Id. at 2122.
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LGE patents.'
b. TransCoreLP v. Electronic Transaction
ConsultantsCorp. 7
After the Supreme Court decided Quanta, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "an
unconditional covenant not to sue authorized sales by the
covenantee, for purposes of patent exhaustion."88 TransCore,
a manufacturer of automated toll collection systems, entered
into a settlement agreement with Mark IV, including an
unconditional covenant not to sue for future infringement.8 9
Several years later, TransCore sued Electronic Transaction
Consultants Corp. (ETC) for infringement of three patents
to toll-collection systems ETC purchased from Mark
related
0
9

IV

TransCore relied heavily on the Federal Circuit's earlier
opinion in Jacobs v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,"' and
contended that sales under a covenant not to sue are not
authorized.9 2 In Jacobs, the Federal Circuit discussed "the
respective roles of a license term and a covenant not to sue in
a settlement agreement."93 The Jacobs court noted that "if all
that Jacobs intended to do through the settlement agreement
was to free Analog of its liability for infringement . . . (the
covenant not to sue) would have been fully sufficient to serve
that purpose"; however, the license provision goes much
This language
further, by granting an affirmative right.9
between
licenses and
a
key
distinction
seemed to recognize
9
5
covenants not to sue. However, in TransCore, the Federal
Circuit clarified that the Jacobs court was only
"differentiating between settlement terms for the express
purpose of determining the contracting parties' intent in the

86. See id. at 2120.
87. TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
88. Id. at 1274.
89. Id. at 1273.
90. Id.
91. Jacobs v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 370 F.3d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
92. Transcore,563 F.3d at 1274.
93. Id. at 1274-75.
94. Jacobs, 370 F.3d at 1101.
95. Brief of Amicus Curiae Motorola, Inc., supra note 23, at 1-2.
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context of an implied license analysis."9 6
The TransCore court reasoned that the grant of a patent
provides the patentee with the right to exclude, not an
affirmative right to practice the patent.97 Therefore, a patent
owner, "by license or otherwise, cannot convey an affirmative
right to practice a patented invention," because "one cannot
convey what one does not own."98 A patentee "can only convey
the freedom from suit."9 9 Therefore, the pertinent question is
not whether an agreement is structured as a covenant not to
sue or a license grant, because that difference is only one of
form, not substance.'00 The pertinent question is whether the
agreement authorizes salesl-a sale is authorized if it falls
within the scope of a covenant not to sue.0 2 Using this
framework to analyze patent exhaustion, the parties need
only determine whether a sale was within the scope of the
agreement.'
The agreement does not need to extend to
downstream customers or users to trigger patent exhaustion;
it need only authorize the first-sale by the licensee or
covenantee.10 ' However, a covenant not to sue may not
provide the necessary authorization to sell if it only applies to
past conduct or is limited
to only the acts of making and
10 5
using, and not selling.
B. Two CurrentHigh-Tech Licensing Practices
High-tech industries, such as the wireless communication
and semiconductor industries, frequently develop products
using a multi-step chain of production. 0 As a result, various
high-tech companies own large portfolios of patents that cover
all or portions of an entire product value chain.0 7
Accordingly, many high-tech companies have licensing
agreements with a diverse array of companies, each with
96. TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1275.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1276.
101. Id.
102. See TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d
1271, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1277.
105. See id. at 1276.
106. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 10.
107. Id.
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different licensing needs depending on where they operate
along the multi-step chain of production. 1 8 Two current hightech licensing practices for potentially avoiding patent
exhaustion include (1) restricting the grant of "use" rights and
a covenant not to sue instead of a typical license
(2) using
9
grant.

1. Restrictingthe Grant of "Use" Rights
Patents confer on their owners the statutorily created,
exclusive right to "make, use, offer to sell, sell, or import into
the United States" the claimed invention." ' Like holders of
any property, patent owners may license distinct rights to
third parties without losing the remainder.11" ' For example, a
patent owner may restrict "use" rights by limiting the
licensee's authority to only making and selling certain
components.12
The restriction of use rights can be seen in a company's
license agreements. Qualcomm is a wireless communications
research and development company that has many license
agreements, called ASIC Patent License Agreements
(APLAs), with chipmakers that provide chipmakers with
"nontransferable, worldwide, nonexclusive, restricted licenses
to its portfolio of technically necessary patents." 3
Qualcomm's APLA license has a limited scope and requires
the licensee to act within those limitations."' A licensee can
make its own application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs)
under an APLA." '5 Furthermore, the agreement "provides the
chipmaker-licensee with a restricted license to sell ASICs, but
only to handset makers that the APLA defines to be an
'Authorized Purchaser' for incorporation into fully assembled
handsets.""' 6 Authorized Purchasers are handset makers with
licenses through Qualcomm's "Subscriber Unit License
Agreement ("SULA") to make, use and sell fully assembled
108. Id.
109. See infra Parts III-IV.
110. See HOLMES, supra note 77, § 2:1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 19 n.7;
HOLMES, supra note 77, § 2:1.
112. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 17-18.
113. Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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handsets that, in the absence of a SULA, would infringe
Qualcomm's patents.""7
Qualcomm's APLA does not explicitly grant a license to
the chipmaker-licensee to use the ASICs."8 Instead, it states
that "the rights to use the ASICs to make, operate or sell
handsets are only conferred by licensing agreements between
Qualcomm and Authorized Purchasers (i.e., by SULAs)..... 9
2. Use of Covenants Not to Sue
Many large high-tech companies "own issued patents in
many jurisdictions such as the United States, Europe or
Japan."2 ° These companies with extensive patent portfolios
"occasionally enter mutual, portfolio-wide agreements with
other companies not to assert current or future patent rights
against each other." 2 ' This result is achieved by using
covenants not to sue, or non-assertion covenants."'
As Nokia details in its amicus brief in Quanta, the
decision to enter into one of these agreements may reflect
several business concerns."
A covenant not to sue may
simply use patents as a metric for "some other aspect of the
company's operations such as its research investments" or "be
related to another business relationship between the
parties."" For example, there may be a desire to enter into
patent peace agreements to avoid "patent thickets," an
industry term describing "the fact that modern electronics
devices often implicate hundreds of different patent rights
that can be difficult to separate and identify."'25
The Supreme Court's patent exhaustion precedents have
all involved license agreements, not covenants not to sue. 6
High-tech companies such as Nokia, Qualcomm, and Motorola
117. Id.
118. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 8.
119. Id.
120. Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 19.
121. Id.
122. Cf. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 17 n.6
("Qualcomm agrees with the point made by Nokia in its amicus brief... that
mere cross-covenants not to sue for infringement do not amount to authority
and are incapable of exhausting the patents that are the subject of such crosscovenants.").
123. Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 19.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Brief of Amicus Curiae Motorola, Inc., supra note 23, at 8.
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have argued that the Court should limit its holding to only
the patent exhaustion effect under a license, and not
encompass other types of agreements that may, or may not,
12 7
grant or convey patent rights such as covenants not to sue.
Though covenants not to sue and patent licenses are closely
128
related, there may be significant differences between them.
For example, a covenant not to sue is personal in nature and
is not inherently transferable.'2 9
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUES
This comment addresses two legal issues regarding the
limits of patent exhaustion's authorized sale requirement
that affect current high-tech licensing practices. The first is
whether patent exhaustion's authorized sale requirement can
be satisfied when a patent agreement does not grant use
rights. The second is under what circumstances does a
covenant not to sue satisfy the authorized sale requirement.
The resolution of these issues, which will clarify when patent
exhaustion is triggered, is important to high-tech companies
with patents covering aspects of both components and
systems over various points in a product value chain.
Further, the resolution of these issues will provide guidance
to high-tech companies who are navigating through patent
thickets.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Policy Considerations
The policy reasons for the patent exhaustion doctrine
conflict. 3 ° The traditional rationale is that patent exhaustion

127. See id. at 3; Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 19 ("The
court's decision here should give companies the flexibility to prove that the
substance of the rights granted and used under a given contract do not
implicate the patent exhaustion doctrine ....
A vigorous application of the
doctrine, however, should not result in bright-line, inflexible rules with
unintended consequences. Parties enter contracts for myriad reasons, and
contracts concerning patents-for instance non-assert provisions-should not
necessarily result in patent exhaustion."); Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 23, at 16.
128. Brief of Amicus Curiae Motorola, Inc., supra note 23, at 8.
129. See, e.g., Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (finding a covenant not to sue nontransferable).
130. SCHLICHER, supra note 29, § 1.69.
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attempts to prevent patentees from "double dipping"- 3
receiving multiple royalties for the same invention.1 1
However, in light of today's high-tech environment, other
policy reasons, such as providing flexibility in dealing with
patent thickets, must also be considered. Six of these policy
considerations are identified below.
1. Prevent "DoubleDipping"by PatentHolders
The most widely stated rationale for patent exhaustion is
to prevent "double dipping."'32 Under this theory, where a
patent holder either sells or authorizes a sale, the patent
holder is deemed to have "bargained for, and received, an
amount equal to the full value for the goods sold."'33 In
Univis, the Court articulated this policy as "when the
patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention
by the sale of the article[,] ...the patent law affords no basis
for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold."'34
2. Place the Burden on PatenteesBecause They Are in the
Best Positionto Notify Purchasersof Product
Limitations
Aside from the "double dipping" prevention rationale,
patent exhaustion forces the patent holder to notify the
purchaser when a product's "subsequent use or resale is
subject to limitations or patent infringement claims."'35
Arguably, it is less costly for the patent holder or licensee to
notify the purchasers than requiring the purchasers to find
this information.'3 6 In sum, the burden is placed on patent
holders because they are in the best position to minimize the
problem of informing
purchasers about product limitations at
13 7
the lowest cost.

131. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 3.
132. See, e.g., Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 13.
(citing B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
133. See, e.g., id. (quoting B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
134. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
135. SCHLICHER, supra note 29, § 1:69.
136. Id.
137. See id.
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3. PreventPatent ExhaustionDesign-Arounds Due to
Trivial Differences
The patent exhaustion doctrine is triggered by the
authorized sale of a component that substantially, even if not
completely, embodies essential features of a patented
invention.'38
Without the "substantially embodies"
requirement, "patent holders could authorize the sale of
[articles] that are complete with the exception of one minor
step . . . and extend their rights through each downstream
purchaser all the way to the end user."'39
When considering whether an article substantially
embodies a patent, the relevant characteristic is not whether
material has been added or removed, but whether the final
steps in producing the infringing article were common and
noninventive. 4 ° This prevents patent exhaustion designarounds based on trivial differences in a product or a patent's
scope.' 4'
Therefore, patentees who wish to acquire
compensation for authorized sales from more than one point
in a product's value chain
may do so only for substantially
42
different embodiments.
4. Make the Termination of PatentRights a Predictable
Event
Patent exhaustion legally terminates a patent holder's
exclusionary rights.' The circumstances under which patent
exhaustion occurs should be clear to both patentees and
licensees in order to minimize the zone of uncertainty when
contracting patent rights.'
Greater predictability in
determining when a patentee's legal rights are terminated
will improve the bargaining of economic interests during
licensing negotiations.145

138. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008).
139. Id. at 2118.
140. See id. at 2118-20.
141. Cf id. (discussing the extent to which a product must embody a patent
in order to trigger patent exhaustion).
142. Cf id. (discussing the extent to which a product must embody a patent
in order to trigger patent exhaustion).
143. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Business Machines Corp., supra
note 46, at 25.
144. Id.
145. See id.
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5. Allow Flexibility in ContractingPatentRights to
Promote Economic Efficiency
While preventing patent holders from extracting multiple
royalties for the same invention, the patent exhaustion
doctrine should also allow patentees flexibility in
contracting. " 6 This flexibility should include allowing "patent
holders . . . to license their patent rights under various
restrictions," subject to the antitrust laws. "7 For example, a
patent owner may license another party to practice the
invention in "only a particular geographic area or for only a
particular purpose". " '
A patent holder should have the flexibility to "pick a
point along a chain of production from which to extract
royalties." "9 However, "once that point is chosen and the
patent holder receives value for its invention, the patent
holder should be stuck with that choice.""0 By allowing the
financial obligations of patent licensing to be spread across
the product value chain, greater economic efficiency results
because the parties benefiting most from the licensed
technology can carry a greater share of the financial
burden."'
6. Allow Flexibility in Dealing with Patent Thickets
The term "patent thickets" describes the fact that
"modern electronics devices often implicate hundreds of
different patent rights that can be difficult to separate and
identify." 2 Unlike traditional industries, in which there is a
closer correspondence between a patented invention and a
product, many high-tech industry products incorporate
numerous technologies that may be the subject of hundreds of
patents."' "With this myriad of often-overlapping patents, no
technology business can review every potentially relevant
patent before designing and commercializing a new
146. Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 2.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 22.
152. Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 19.
153. See Brief of Dell, Inc., Hewlett-Packard, Co., Cisco Systems, Inc., and
eBay Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14-15, Quanta, 128 S.Ct.
2109 (2007) (No. 06-937).
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product.""s As a result, substantial time and resources may
be invested in a new product before a company becomes
aware that an arguably patented technology is embedded
within the new product.'5 5 Because redesigning a product
after significant investments have been made may not be
economically viable, a patent owner asserting infringement
may be able to demand a royalty that reflects more than just
the ordinary market value for the patented technology.'5 6
To overcome the existence of patent thickets and promote
design freedom, high-tech companies should have flexibility
in negotiating for patent peace without fear of triggering
patent exhaustion.' 57 Patent peace agreements allow hightech companies to focus their engineers on inventing
future
58
products, rather than providing litigation support.'
B. Can Patent ExhaustionBe Triggered,Even Though "Use"
Rights Are Not Granted?
Some argue that when a patent license agreement grants
authority to exercise only certain make/use/sell rights, or only
grants authority that is restricted to a particular field, the
patent owner has not bargained for or received adequate
compensation for the patent. "' Therefore, when "use" rights
are not granted, some believe that the patent owner has not
received adequate compensation for the rights that have not
been licensed.' °
An entity cannot sell rights that it does not possess. 6 '
Therefore, a component manufacturer "that has been granted
authority only to make and sell-but not use-such
components cannot confer upon its customers the unrestricted
authority to use the components by combining them with
other components to create a finished product." 2 Similarly,
an entity with a restricted authority to sell only a particular
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 16.
157. See id. at 14-15.
158. See id.
159. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 17.
160. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis omitted). A patentee's intent to withhold use
rights may be relevant in an implied license analysis, but is of no consequence
in a patent exhaustion analysis.
161. Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 18.
162. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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component "cannot confer upon the buyer broader authority
with respect to other
components or products in violation of
163
restriction."
that
It is good policy to permit patent holders and licensees
with different needs to make licensing agreements with
restricted or conditional authority because it permits
licensees to pay only for the authority that is needed.'"
Further, the ability to restrict license scope by dividing and
separately licensing make/use/sell rights, or granting
authority in connection with only one particular field
of use,
6 5
thickets.
patent
manage
companies
high-tech
helps
However, it is not clear that patentees should have to
receive value for all rights before triggering patent
exhaustion. 166 A patent holder's receipt of sufficient value for
a subset of6 rights may provide a sufficient "reward," as stated
in Univis.' 1
If a patentee is able to sell all but an insignificant right
without triggering patent exhaustion, then the patentee
would be able to bypass patent exhaustion and receive
multiple royalties for the same invention. Of course, if a
licensee has been granted the right to use and make, and not
the right to sell, then there can be no authorized sale.'6 8 In
contrast to making and using, it is through a sale that an
article is transferred to a downstream third party, which in
turn brings into consideration
the policies necessary to
169
party.
third
that
protect
Because Qualcomm's APLAs restrict chipmaker-licensee
ASIC sales to only SULA handset makers, the only
authorized sales that the chipmaker-licensees can make are
to already-licensed handset makers.' °
However, if
Qualcomm's APLAs granted the right to make and sell
ASICs, but did not restrict the chipmaker-licensees to sell
only to SULA handset makers, then the chipmaker-licensees
should be authorized to sell ASICs to any handset maker,
thereby triggering patent exhaustion. If patent exhaustion is
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 20.
See id.
But see id.
See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
See HOLMES, supra note 77, § 17:4.9[D].
See supra Part IV.A.
See Brief of Qualcomm Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 23, at 8.
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not triggered, then Qualcomm could potentially receive
royalties from both chipmakers and handset makers for the
same invention. 171 In either case, Qualcomm will not be able
to extract royalties from both chipmakers and handset
makers who have purchased ASICs through an authorized
sale, if the handset products substantially
embody the
172
patents licensed by the chipmakers.
C. When Does a Covenant Not to Sue Satisfy the Authorized
Sale Requirement?
High-tech companies use patent license agreements and
covenants not to sue for various reasons and to achieve
different effects. 73 For example, patent license agreements
are often used when resolving assertions of patent
infringement while covenants not to sue are often used "when
businesses units, product lines, or divisions are sold,
acquired, or spun off into separate stand-alone entities.' 74
Covenants not to sue may also be used when parties wish to
simply clear potentially blocking patent positions
or conduct
1 75
their businesses without fear of patent litigation.
Both patent licenses and covenants are intellectual
property contracts that are interpreted and construed under
the law of contracts.7 6 Some argue that "the word 'license'
has become so uncertain of meaning and so encumbered by
inconsistent case law respecting the implied rights and
obligations of the parties that [license-drafters] cannot be
altogether certain what [they have] done when [they] grant a
'license.'" 177 This uncertainty caused some license-drafters to
utilize covenants not to sue for infringement, rather than
license grants, in order to avoid potential problems due to
implied assumptions under licenses.'7 8 TransCore, however,

171. See supra Part V.A.
172. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109
(2008) (stating that the authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies
a patent exhausts a patent holder's rights).
173. Brief of Amicus Curiae Motorola, Inc., supra note 23, at 1.
174. Id.
175. See

Brief

of

Amicus

Curiae

Papst

Licensing

GMBH

& Co. in Support of Respondent at 15-16, Quanta, 128 S.Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937).
176. 1 HAROLD EINHORN AND THOMAS J. PARKER, PATENT LICENSING
TRANSACTIONS § 1.01[2][a] (2008).

177. Id. § 1.04[2].
178. Id.
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makes clear that covenants17 not to sue may satisfy the
authorized sale requirement.
The TransCore decision provides a more predictable rule
for when the authorized sale requirement is satisfied-a sale
is authorized if it falls within the scope of a covenant not to
sue. 180 However, this more predictable rule may be too
inflexible, because it does not seem to leave room for
negotiating patent peace agreements or other strictly
business relationships without fear of triggering patent
exhaustion.
V. PROPOSAL
A. A License Grant with the Right to Sell, but Not the Right to
Use, Should Satisfy the Authorized Sale Requirement
A patent license grant, with the right to sell, but not the
right to use, should satisfy the authorized sale requirement
and trigger patent exhaustion.
Consistent with legal
precedent where the right to sell is granted, courts should
find that a patent holder can receive a sufficient reward for
its patented invention, even though only a subset of the
bundle of patent rights is bargained for. If patent exhaustion
is not triggered, then a patentee could acquire sufficient value
for a subset of rights, and purposely leave out an insignificant
stick (e.g., make or use rights depending on the
circumstances). The patentee would then be able to bypass
patent exhaustion, and potentially receive multiple royalties
for the same invention. Further, in contrast to the granting
of make and use rights, the granting of the right to sell allows
an article to be transferred to a downstream third party,
which brings into consideration
the policies necessary to
181
protect that third party.
B. A CovenantNot to Sue Should Satisfy the Authorized Sale
Requirement if a Patentee Extracts Sufficient Reward for Its
Patents
The courts should find that the use of a covenant not to

179. See
180. See
1271, 1276
181. See

supra Part II.A.2.b.
TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
supra Part V.A.
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sue satisfies the authorized sale requirement if the patentee
extracts a sufficient reward for its patents. Otherwise, a
patentee could extract a sufficient reward for providing a
covenantee with the ability to sell the patented invention and
bypass patent exhaustion. However, the rule should be
flexible enough to allow market competitors to enter into
patent peace agreements, or other strictly business
relationships that do not sufficiently exploit patent rights,
without triggering patent exhaustion. Providing the ability to
navigate around "patent thickets" is especially important
today since patent litigation is unusually expensive.'8 2
If the effect of a transaction is that a patent holder
sufficiently exploits the value of its patented invention, then
patent exhaustion should apply." "In such a case, the patent
holder has received [sufficient] value for giving up its right to
exclude and should not be allowed to extract additional
royalties from downstream use" for the same patented
invention.' 8' If a covenant not to sue does not provide for an
authorized sale, and therefore, does not trigger patent
exhaustion, then third party purchasers may want to protect
themselves by demanding indemnification from component
suppliers with respect to purchased items. 8 5
Depending on the objective circumstances surrounding a
patent transaction and the activities of the covenantee, a
covenant not to sue "may or may not implicate the type of
'consent for value' exchange that justifies the patent
exhaustion doctrine."'86 For example, a contract that includes
a covenant not to sue "may be part of a larger business
transaction" and may not extract royalties from a particular
point in the product value chain or reflect authorization to
practice a particular invention' 8 7 A covenant not to sue that
does not involve royalties for a particular patented invention
should not result in patent exhaustion because the patentee

182. Brief of Dell, Inc., supra note 154, at 20-21. For example, the cost of
litigating a case with more than twenty-five million dollars at risk is
approximately three million dollars through discovery and five million dollars
through trial and appeal. Id.
183. Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 20.
184. Id.
185. See HOLMES, supra note 77, § 17:4.9[S].
186. Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 19.
187. Id.
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has not been rewarded for the use of the invention. 188
The proposed test for determining whether the
authorized sale requirement is satisfied is: "would a
reasonable person believe that a patentee had already
sufficiently exploited their patent and is trying to double dip?"
This test is objective and should include analysis of the
specific contract in question, the circumstances surrounding
the formation of the contract, 89' and whether or not the patent
holder has received a sufficient reward for its patents.
Objective factors that bear on the analysis should include
whether the patentee and covenantee are market
competitors, whether the patentee is attempting to extract
royalties from multiple points in the product value chain, 9 '
and whether the patentee is a non-practicing entity. While
not providing the same degree of predictability as a brightline rule, the objective "reasonable person" standard prevents
patent exhaustion design-arounds while providing the
necessary flexibility to allow high-tech companies to enter
into patent peace agreements and other strictly business
relationships without fear of triggering patent exhaustion.
VI. CONCLUSION
High-tech companies rely on patent laws to provide
incentive for capital investment in research and development,
and contract laws to allow parties to sell, license, and
structure their capital investments efficiently. 9 ' The patent
exhaustion doctrine provides an important check on a patent
holder's ability to exploit its patents."' Because patent
exhaustion's authorized sale requirement determines when a
patent holder's patent rights are potentially terminated, it is
important to provide a predictable guideline to both patent
holders and licensees."'
However, a more predictable
guideline should not come at the expense of being so inflexible
as to not allow for patent peace agreements or other strictly
business relationships without the fear of triggering patent
188.
(1942).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See id. at 20-21; United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251
See Brief for Amici Curiae Nokia, supra note 9, at 19-20.
See id.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
See supra Part IV.A.
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exhaustion.
This comment proposes solutions to two legal issues
regarding the limits of patent exhaustion's "authorized sale"
requirement, which affect current high-tech licensing
practices.' The proposed solution to the first legal issue is
that the authorized sale requirement may be satisfied by a
patent license grant, even though it does not grant "use"
rights, because otherwise, it would allow a patentee to easily
bypass patent exhaustion by acquiring sufficient value for a
subset of rights while purposely leaving out an insignificant
right.'95 Further, in contrast to making and using, it is
through a sale that an article is transferred to a downstream
third party, which brings into consideration the policies 9 '
necessary to protect that third party. The proposed solution
to the second legal issue is that the use of a covenant not to
sue may satisfy the authorized sale requirement, if a patent
holder extracts a sufficient reward for its patents.97 An
objective test that takes into account the circumstances
surrounding a patent transaction is proposed for determining
whether the authorized sale requirement is satisfied.'9 8 The
test considers objective factors including whether the
patentee and covenantee are market competitors, whether
the patentee is attempting to extract royalties from multiple
points in a product value chain, and whether the patentee is a
non-practicing entity.1 99

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See supra Parts III and V.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.

